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1. Introduction: the wage inequality / job insecurity trade-off1 
Since the crisis of the Fordist «golden age» with its corollaries 
of stable, full-time, full-life, (male) full-employment and of full-
welfare entitlements, «flexibility» has become the miracle cure for 
almost every kind of labour market need for re-adjustment. 
’Flexibility’ is a polysemous term: following Atkinson [1984] we 
can identify four different types of labour market flexibility, quite 
often indicating opposite goals and purposes. Numerical flexibility 
and functional flexibility have usually been presented in the socio 
economic literature as reflecting the trade-off between external 
and internal flexibility; that is, the alternative between considering 
the workforce as a pure cost to be shrunk or a resource for a 
competitive firm [Streeck 1991]. Whilst the mainstream labour 
economic debate since the early 1980s has assumed numerical 
flexibility as a proxy for labour market efficiency, the European 
socio-economic literature has pointed out that diversified quality 
production in small and medium highly innovative firms requires 
their skilled workforces to have functional forms of flexibility 
[Piore and Sabel 1984; Bagnasco 1977; Trigilia 1986; Beccattini 
1987], as well as the debate on the «Rhine model of capitalism» as 
opposed to mass, «neo-Fordist», low-quality production). 
If temporal flexibility – that is, the possibility to adjust working 
time and working hours according to the needs of the employer 
(or in theory also those of the employees) has been mainly 
addressed in terms of part-time diffusion – wage flexibility, that is, 
the possibility of firms to adjust or to differentiate wage levels 
(not only according to labor productivity – which is in some way 
‘justifiable’ – but more often according to institutional 
differentiations that stratify along ‘particularistic’ cleavages) has 
been long neglected by sociological research, which to date has 
been surprisingly little interested in this kind of fundamental social 
inequality. 
The four alternative meanings of the term ‘flexibility’ illustrate 
quite well the possible trade-offs between various mechanisms of 
flexibility in different labour market arrangements. Yet, these 
                                                                                    
1  The paper has been presented to The Low Pay, Low Skill, and Low Income (LOPSI-
Equalsoc) Cross-cutting Workshop, 26-27 June 2009, Milan. We would like to thank all the 
participants and the discussants for their comments. 
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flexibility types are not seen as equally giving rise to insecurity; 
rather, some may introduce insecurity in individuals’ labour 
market careers, while others may play a crucial role in upskilling 
the workforce. 
In particular, wage flexibility is currently being analysed as part 
of a trade-off between wage inequality and job insecurity as two 
different and plausibly inter-changeable levers for firm and labour 
market institutional adjustments [Blau and Kahn 2002]. Maurin 
and Postel-Vinay [2005] find that higher wage gaps are associated 
with lower job security gaps.  
 
They write:  
«Continental European countries, such as Germany or France, do 
not tolerate wage inequalities to the same extent as the United Kingdom 
or Ireland; yet they do tolerate much more substantial inequalities in job 
security. Mediterranean countries, such as Italy or Greece, do not accept 
wage inequalities as large as Germany or France, but do accept still larger 
job security inequalities».  
 
This is consistent with the assumption that job (in)security 
represents the main channel of adjustment to macroeconomic 
shocks in Europe; and this conclusion runs in largely the same 
direction as the findings of DiPrete et al. [2006], who compare 
France and the US. These authors show that the French labour 
market has absorbed macroeconomic shocks to a large extent 
through the creation of low-adjustment cost or low security jobs 
and through the allocation of an increasingly large share of low 
skilled workers to those jobs. French – and we could say Italian as well 
- adjustment strategies have thus produced rising inequality in the 
job security component, rather than in the wage component, of 
the employment relationship or the quantity of jobs produced in 
different skill categories. Empirical studies [Barbieri and Scherer 
2008, 2009] have shown that the creation of «new forms of 
atypical employment» in Italy have followed exactly the path of 
segmenting the labor market between the insider core workforce 
and a secondary sector made up of unstable and under-protected 
jobs. But this still does not say anything about what has happened 
on the wage side in the Italian deregulated labor market.  
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2. A step back: eurosclerosis and the ‘corporatists’ way to labor market 
deregulation 
Before focusing on labour market deregulation, we take a step 
back to recall the reasons why so many European states in the 
1980s and 1990s so readily responded to the siren song of 
flexibility. This brings us to the demise of the Fordist period with 
its guarantees on the labour market. Such guarantees (EPL, 
welfare, industrial relations) were cited as the institutional bases 
for the «eurosclerosis» of the European labour markets and their 
incapacity to re-absorb the amount of unemployment created by 
adverse and largely common shocks, from oil price increases to 
the slowdown in productivity growth [Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman 1991; Grubb nad Wells 1993; Saint-Paul 1996; Nickell 
1997]. As Blanchard [2005] recognizes, since the early 1980s, 
owing to financial pressure and intellectual arguments, most 
governments have opted for a supply-side perspective as regards 
labour policies. Notwithstanding a few authoritative, and isolated, 
voices denouncing a «sclerosis of objectivity» among economic 
experts [Korpi 1996], the EPL/unemployment nexus2, and more 
generally the welfare/labour market nexus, was accepted by policy 
makers and public opinion makers as the main cause of 
persistently high unemployment in Europe. Nonetheless, in 
«continental-corporatist» Europe, labour market deregulation 
followed a «corporatist» pattern of labour market de-regulation, 
concentrating on the de-regulation of so-called «non-standard» 
employment relations for particular/marginal groups within the 
labour market while leaving «standard» employment and existing 
work contracts for the core (male, unionised) workforce largely 
unchanged. This process of flexibilisation «at the margins» of the 
labour market, has been termed «partial and targeted deregulation» 
[Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000] or a «partial reform strategy» 
[OECD 2006]. Whilst both approaches stress the nature of limited 
labour market deregulation as not applicable to existing labour 
contracts, the former focuses on its age-targeted characteristic 
                                                                                    
2 We cite Bertola [1990], who disputes that EPL strictness is the main cause of 
unemployment levels among the Oecd countries, and Reyneri et al. [2004] who take a socio-
economic perspective on flexibility and social cohesion. 
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while the latter focuses more on the skill divide in the workforce. 
Notwithstanding their similarities, the first «way» of de-regulating 
labour market is exemplified by the Mediterranean countries, 
while the «skill-centred» strategy is best illustrated by Germany 
and other Central and North European countries. And they 
remain quite different as regards their social consequences. 
The literature confirms that the worst situation is that of the 
Mediterranean countries. Spain and Italy stand out as countries 
where the rapid and intense shift from rigid employment 
protection systems to (partial and targeted) flexibilised labour 
markets has given rise to largely work-insecure positions [Jimeno 
and Toharia 1994; Golsch’s 2003] and has exacerbated the 
insider/outsider divide [Bentolila and Dolado 1994; Polavieja 
2005; Barbieri and Scherer 2008, 2009]. Women, young people, 
and in particular the more recent labour market entry cohorts, are 
confined to precarious employment, have increased unemploy-
ment risks, and may be caught in carousel traps at later stages. 
Another specific feature of the «Mediterranean» labour market 
adjustment seems to be the strong persistence of inequality in the 
advancement of labour market careers: the better educated and 
with higher occupational qualifications seem to be better 
protected against entrapment in the secondary, sub-protected 
labour market. Also considering the exit rates from precarious 
employment, professionals in fixed-term jobs appear be in a more 
advantageous situation than unskilled labourers or routine service 
workers on temporary contracts. For the former, non-standard 
work may serve as a ‘bridge’ to a permanent, standard position, 
but for the latter, a temporary job may turn into a ‘trap’ [Giesecke 
and Gross 2003; Fouarge and Layte 2005; Barbieri and Scherer 
2008, 2009].  
Many social scientists [Saint-Paul 1996; Streeck 2003; Blossfeld 
et al. 2005, 2008] have criticised the creation of a two tiered labour 
market with highly protected workers on the one hand, and highly 
flexible jobs (internships, short term contracts, temporary jobs, 
solo-self-employment) mostly for young people, women, new 
entrants, immigrants and/or unskilled workers, on the other. The 
resulting strongly segmented labour market is the worst outcome 
[Muffels and Luijkx 2008] for social equality because it increases 
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social differences without yielding the benefits of a substantial 
improvement in the performance of the labour market.  
Some political scientists endorsing the «new-politics 
perspective» argue that these distinctive forms of labour market 
deregulation and the parallel welfare state retrenchments result 
from resistance by powerful groups of welfare-state clients 
(insider workers, retirees) who have managed to direct welfare and 
labour market reforms towards the (non-organised) new cohorts 
of labour market entrants [Pierson 1996, 2001; Soskice 1990]. 
Others, closer to the «power-resources perspective», tend to 
interpret it as resulting from distributive conflicts between major 
interest/political groups, given the budget deficits caused by post-
industrial changes and government attempts to promote cuts 
[Korpi 2003]. This literature evidences that the «macro» 
institutional level (the industrial relation system, as well as labor 
policies and the welfare state) has played a significant role in 
shaping both the forms and the social consequences of these 
processes of labour market flexibilisation – and therefore should 
be considered when seeking the mechanisms that have produced a 
given outcome on the labor market. 
Today, even the «mainstream» economic literature admits that 
a strategy of labour market reform «at the margins» may have 
adverse long-term effects at odds with good labour market 
performance [Blanchard and Landier 2001; Dolado et al. 2002; 
OECD 2004, 2006], or it may produce only temporary, 
«honeymoon» effects [Bertola 1990; Boeri and Garibaldi 2007]. 
When the regulation of standard work contracts is overly strict, 
employers tend to recruit mainly on temporary contracts and are 
reluctant to convert these contracts into permanent ones. Laying 
off permanent workers is so difficult and costly that companies 
have a strong preference for temporary labour, even if this is to 
the detriment of productivity: training new workers is a sunk cost. 
The result is an increased concentration of labour turnover among 
workforce groups over-represented in temporary/atypical jobs, 
potentially trapping some of them in a future of «precarious» jobs 
with high levels of employment insecurity [OECD 2006], as well 
as under-investment in human capital, which wastes part of their 
productivity potential. 
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We should stress, however, that the two strategies of 
deregulating labor markets «at the margins» – the skill/cohort 
divide – are quite different in how they generate social inequality: 
inequalities have arisen in the «continental way» to flexibility as a 
consequence of different LM rewards for skills and competencies; 
while in the «Mediterranean» way to flexibility, inequality is still 
firmly anchored to an ascriptive factor: age/cohort. It is not our 
intention here to draw up a typology of labor market adjustment 
strategies, combining the wage gap-work insecurity gap and the 
age-skill divide [see Barbieri 2009]. Rather, the focus of this paper 
is to verify whether, in the specific Italian situation, the wage 
inequality/job insecurity trade-off has worked as envisaged by the 
theory, or whether instead – as quite often happens in the Italian 
situation – the worst aspects of the two ways of adjusting labor 
market have combined to generate even stronger mechanisms of 
social inequality and labor market exclusion for (young) atypical 
workers.  
 
The paper will proceed as follows: after presenting the 
theoretical background and main research hypotheses, it describes 
the datasets and methods used to establish the magnitude of the 
wage gap between insider and outsider workers in present-day 
Italy, briefly dealing with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity 
and the need to control for the unobservables. The following 
empirical sections will analyse the micro determinants of FTC 
wage penalties. We shall see how micro dimensions in inter- and 
intra-individual variations cannot completely explain the wage 
penalty attached to the new forms of flexible employment, 
therefore leaving room for a macro, institutional, explanation 
grounded on the role of the insider/outsider scenario and the 
implicit exchange [Soskice 1990] produced by the macro-
corporatist agreements of the nineties. 
3. Theoretical background and research hypothesis 
Whether the wage levels of standard and temporary workers 
differ systematically is not merely an empirical question, for it is a 
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source of considerable theoretical debate. From an empirical point 
of view, international research has shown that temporary workers 
are generally lower paid than ones in permanent employment, 
although the magnitude of the gap varies quite substantially 
according to the national labor market structure – and the 
estimation method used [Davia and Hernanz 2002; Booth et al. 
2002; Hagen 2002; Rica 2004; de Graaf-Zijl 2005; Brown and 
Sessions 2005; Mertens and McGinnity 2005; Gash and 
McGinnity 2007; Hevenstone 2008; Gebel 2009]. Much less is 
known about Italy: the few empirical studies conducted report 
penalties for non standard contracts, in terms of either earning 
levels or earning stability [Picchio 2006; Cappellari and Leonardi 
2006]. Nonetheless there is still scarce empirical evidence 
connecting the following three issues: first, the level of inequality in 
wages between contingent and secure work positions; second, the 
determinants of such wage inequality; and third the degree of internal 
wage differentiation among temporary workers. 
From a theoretical point of view, should we expect to find a 
wage premium, a wage penalty, or no difference in the rewards for 
standard and non-standard jobs? According to various 
declinations of the theory of compensating differentials (Rosen 
1986), in a market unaffected by information asymmetry and 
characterized by mobility between jobs, we may expect a wage 
premium for workers holding temporary positions which 
compensates for the risks associated with the limited duration of 
their contracts. Moreover, as noted in the previous section, Italy is 
largely a country of «job-insecurity» labor market adjustment, 
which may therefore support the expectation that some monetary 
«compensation» is forthcoming because of the lack of guarantees.  
Nonetheless, a large body of literature reports that, in Italy, 
partial and targeted labor market deregulation has also been 
intended to reduce labour costs, while empirical research shows 
that, compared to permanent employment, flexible jobs are less 
appreciable in terms of working conditions, risks of subsequent 
unemployment, and career interruption [Gagliarducci 2005; 
Barbieri and Scherer 2007; Oecd 2006]. This is not entirely 
surprising, given that the aim of the labor market deregulations of 
the 1990s was to include the weakest and marginal segments of 
the workforce in the labor market. To be realistic, the wage 
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premium would require workers to be both perfectly informed 
about vacancies and (overall) free to choose among a set of job 
offers differing only by contractual arrangement – and the amount 
of remuneration. This is clearly not the case of the present Italian 
labor market, where the majority of job-seekers have only the 
options of accepting atypical employment or postponing their 
entry into the labor market. Based on these considerations, our 
first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Although Italy should be viewed as a case of labor market 
adjustment based on job-insecurity more than wage-inequality, the 
compensation hypothesis will not be confirmed, owing to the violated 
assumption of free choice between different jobs in the primary and secondary 
labor markets. On the contrary, a wage gap between FTC and permanent 
employment is expected, and it is most likely due to the lower investment 
incentives in human capital that occur in FTC. 
 
Two additional theoretical contributions from labor economics 
are relevant to our purposes here: both the signalling (Spence 
1973) and the screening [Stiglitz 1975] theories consider 
temporary jobs as partial answers to the information asymmetry 
problem [Guell and Petrangolo 2000; Booth et al. 2002; 
McGinnity et al., 2005]. In other words, employers hire new 
entrants on a FTC basis in order to test them for a trial period 
longer than the standard one scheduled for a permanent position 
so that they can evaluate their work productivity better. Some 
studies seem to support the signalling/screening hypothesis for 
Italy [Ichino et al. 2003; Berton et al. 2007; Picchio 2007]. This may 
produce a situation in which both low and high productive 
workers are hired on a FTC: in particular, workers characterized 
by high levels of work productivity (or ability or motivation) in a 
strongly insider/outsider labor market with strong barriers against 
access to stable positions may choose temporary work in order to 
signal their qualities, and to maximize their future chances of 
being hired permanently [Loh 1994], even if this strategy requires 
them to accept a lower initial wage. Based on these considerations, 
our second hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: Given the heterogeneity among temporary contract holders in 
terms of skills, human capital, work experience, motivations and work 
productivity, we cannot expect a possible wage gap to be equal among all 
flexible workers. On the contrary, we may expect there to be a high level of 
wage gap variation within the same secondary labor market workforce. 
 
Finally, if different kinds of workers, with different 
motivations and endowments, apply for different atypical jobs, the 
presumable consequence is that unobservables will be relevant in 
explaining wage differentials. And, in fact, one of the assumptions 
commonplace among labor market analysts is that temporary and 
standard workers differ not just in observable relevant features 
but also in typically unobservable ones (like ability or motivation, 
or even intelligence).  
Nonetheless, economic theory states that the definition of 
wage levels (and therefore also wage differentials) is strongly 
affected by the capacity of unions (i.e. insiders) to influence firms’ 
production costs [Blanchard and Summers 1986], as well as to 
take advantage from hiring and firing costs [Lindbeck and Snower 
1988] that obviously differ between the insider core workforce 
and marginal, sub-protected workers. 
The cohort distribution of flexible employment provides us 
with some preliminary evidence: fixed term contract holders as a 
group share a series of characteristics typical of the «outsider» 
workforce. They are mainly young first labor market entrants, or 
women, with less market experience, and lower union coverage 
rates. They therefore have lower firing costs. This may account for 
the predicted wage premium for core standard workers. Given 
this institutional-based segmentation of the labor market and the 
subsequent disequilibrium in bargaining dynamics, it may be 
misleading to consider the wage gap as only fully explainable at 
the «micro» level, in terms of different characteristics of the 
workers and/or in terms of adverse selection of those hired on a 
FTC basis.  
Hence the wage penalty that we should find, if it is robust to 
unobserved heterogeneity issues, would suggest other sources of 
inequality that lie mainly at a different – institutional, i.e. macro – 
level [Rosolia and Torrisi 2006]. 
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Based on these considerations, our third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Differentials between permanent and FTC wages will be 
reduced, but not cancelled out, once the observed and unobserved characteristics 
of the FTC workers have been controlled for. This is because such differentials 
originate at the macro level, most likely in the insider/outsider dynamics of 
Italy-specific labor market adjustment. 
 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow for the direct testing of 
either the insider/outsider wage bargaining hypothesis [Bentolila 
and Dolado 1994] or firms’ strategies of labor cost reduction. 
However, these two mechanisms remain as indirect explanations 
of the wage differential paid by atypical workers once the role 
played by their individual observable and unobservable 
characteristics has been controlled for.  
4. Data, methods and sample selection 
As outlined in the previous section, our specific research 
questions concern the magnitude and evolution of wage 
differentials, the unobserved heterogeneity issue as a source of 
earning inequality, and the shape of the wage gap distribution 
among different groups of «atypical» workers. 
We address these questions by drawing on three different 
survey-based data sets for successive periods: 
- The Italian component of the European Community 
Household Panel, for the years between 1995 and 2001. The 
ECHP 7-wave panel dataset provides us with wage information 
covering the pre-post period of the first real deregulation 
introduced in the Italian labor market, namely the 1997 «Legge 
Treu». 
- The cross sectional dataset of the Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth, collected by Bank of Italy for the years 2004 
and 2006 and a panel subsample referring to the same period. 
- The Italian component of the Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions survey (Eu-Silc) which comprises both the 
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three wave panel for the years 2004-2006 and the 2006 cross 
sectional dataset. 
As regards methods, cross sectional datasets have been 
analyzed using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, quantile 
regression (QR), and statistical matching procedures; while 
Between (BE) and Fixed effects (FE) models have been estimated 
when analysing panel data3. OLS estimations in fact, do not allow 
for any control on unobservables, so that fixed effects panel 
models are the best option for dealing with unobserved 
heterogeneity issues. Put differently, FE regression controls for 
omitted/unobserved(able) variables that differ between cases but 
are constant over time (e.g. individual-level unobserved 
differences in cognitive and noncognitive abilities, such as 
motivation, intelligence, sociability, the ability to focus on tasks, 
self-regulation, self esteem, health and mental health, etc.)4. 
If OLS were used, we would compare wage levels across 
different individuals with different contractual arrangements, 
whereas by using fixed effects models we compare wage levels 
within the same worker before and after he/she makes a transition 
from a fixed term job to a permanent one. Given that the 
parameter estimations are based on intra-individual variation over 
time, they depend on the relevant covariates being time-varying 
(which is why gender, usually time constant, is omitted)5 
[Wooldridge 2002]. 
The models are based on a standard wage mincerian equation 
(in which the salary is a function of age, age squared, years of 
tenure and experience of the worker: see Polacheck [2007], plus a 
set of additional dummy variables controlling for gender, 
                                                                                    
3 Random Effect models have been estimated for each panel analysis. Following the 
Hausman’s test, we opted for FE models. The complete stata outputs of the analyses can 
be obtained from the authors. 
4 Regression with between effects (BE) controls for omitted/unobserved(able) 
variables that change over time but are constant between cases (unobserved or 
unobservable ‘macro-level’ effects, such as time/period/cohorts effects). Finally, regression 
with the random effects (RE) estimator controls for both types of fixed and between 
effects, that is, the co-occurrence of i) omitted/unobserved(able) variables that may be 
constant over time but vary between cases, and ii) other omitted/unobserved(able) 
variables that may be fixed between cases but vary over time.  
5 However, it should be borne in mind that fixed effect panel models, while being the 
best means to deal with unobserved heterogeneity issues, are quite “conservative” and 
potentially underestimate the negative wage gap for FTC. 
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education, occupation, industrial branch, firm size, plus on-the-
job-training (ECHP analysis), family characteristics and work 
career (Shiw). The dependent variable is the net hourly wage in 
statistical matching estimations and the log-transformation of the net 
hourly wage in all regression-based analyses6.  
The log-transformation is required because wage distribution is 
usually left-skewed and the log-wage better fits normality 
assumptions, enabling us to interpret the resulting coefficients in 
terms of semi-elasticity. Hourly wage, not directly available in the 
datasets, has been computed as follows: 
 
(total annual net wage / n. months of work) 
_______________________________________________ 
(n. hours of work per week*4.3) 
 
Finally, the individuals included in our analyses are dependent 
employees aged between 16 and 65, working between 13 and 70 
hours a week, who did not change their employment in the 
previous year, with the consequent exclusion of self-employed 
workers, second-job holders, as well as agricultural workers and 
those paid off-the-books. 
4.1. More on methods: a formal presentation  
We estimate earning regression models, starting with the 
standard (cross-sectional) OLS approach and then moving to 
panel and fixed effect estimation. The simplified cross-section 
earnings regression is: 
y i = z i α + xi β + ε i 
where: y = log wage; zi = observable time-invariant factors;  
xi = observable time-varying factors; εi = random error. 
Decomposing the error term in our panel wage model, we 
obtain: 
y it = z i α + xit β + u i + εit 
                                                                                    
6 Using net wage allows to control for the possible differences in fiscal/tax treatment 
between FTC and regular employment. 
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where i = 1…n, t = 1 … Ti; y it = log wage; z i = observable 
time-invariant factors; x it = observable time-varying factors; u i = 
unobservable heterogeneity variables (time invariant); ε it = 
residual random error. 
A pooled OLS regression of y on z and x would assume that 
there is no correlation across individuals, nor across time periods 
for any individual. This would ignore the individual effect u, which 
generates correlation between the values of (u i + ε i1) … (u i + ε it) 
for each individual i. 
Under favourable conditions (u i  uncorrelated with z i and x it ), 
pooled regression may produce unbiased but inefficient results. 
If u i is correlated with z i  and x it , panel regression is also 
biased. Loosely speaking, a simple panel data regression of y on z 
and x does not account for possible omitted variables bias. In our 
case, if the ability of the workers (u) were negatively correlated 
with FTC dummy, we would obtain downward bias in estimates 
of fixed term contract wage penalties. In order to obtain unbiased 
estimations of our FTC dummy variable, our goal is to capture ui 
and to avoid its possible biasing effect. 
This can be achieved by using a set of n «D» dummy variables, 
one for each person in our sample, which leads to a slightly 
different formulation of our wage model, where u 1 … u n become 
coefficients of a set of n dummy variables: 
 
yit = zi α + xit β + u1 D1i + … + un Dn i + εit 
 
More efficient ways to eliminate u i from the model are time 
differencing and within group transformation. 
 
Time differencing:     
 
Within-group transformation:  
 
The within-group approach (or FE estimation), deriving by de-
meaning dependent and independent variables, is equivalent to 
regressing y on (z , x) and (D1 … Dn). The operation shown 
produces an unbiased and efficient estimation also in the case of a 
111 )( −−− −+−=− itititititit yy εεβxx
iitiitiit yy εε −+−=− βxx )(
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spurious Y-Z correlation due to unobserved, time invariant, 
characteristics. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. ECHP 1995-2001 
Given the selection, the analysis covers 6090 individuals and 
23806 observations, with a mean of 3.9 waves-observations per 
worker. OLS regressions (not shown) on the entire dataset, 
revealed a significant wage penalty for FTC of about 11%. As 
already mentioned, OLS can assure non-distorted estimations only 
in the case of no correlation between the regressors and the error 
term of the wage equation. In order to avoid the risk of a penalty 
due to unobserved heterogeneity, we conducted a fixed effect 
regression model estimation on the panel component of the same 
ECHP dataset. Table 1 presents the results of the FE model on 
the Ln(net hourly wage).  
TAB. 1. Log-hourly wage differentials for temporary workers, fixed effects estimation 
ln(hourly wage) Coeff. Std.Err. P>t 
  
Woman -   
Age 0.070 0.007 0.000 
age – squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
years of exp. -0.003 0.004 0.365 
years of exp.  squared 0.000 0.000 0.098 
Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.276 
OJTraining -0.019 0.004 0.000 
medium educ, -0.006 0.021 0.549 
low educ, -0.013 0.023 0.394 
years of exp.* FTC 0.005 0.001 0.000 
Partime -0.010 0.002 0.000 
FTC -0.093 0.013 0.000 
Public -0.006 0.008 0.314 
(N) (6090)     
Overall R^2=0.23       
Source: ECHP 1995-2001  
Notes: The model controls for year of the panel survey; 27 dummy variables of 
occupational classification, isco88-based; 3 dummies for type of activity; 7 dummies for 
firm dimensions. 
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Since we computed the log transformation of the dependent 
variable, we can interpret the coefficients as the percentages of 
variation in the dependent variable (wage) due to a change over 
time in the parameter that interests us. Put differently, we observe 
a mean wage penalty for the FTC of about 9%, statistically 
significant, after controlling for the relevant socio-demographic 
covariates, individual work history and the characteristics of the 
job.  
The lack of wage premium and – on the contrary – the 
negative wage gap for FTC supports our hypothesis # 1. To be 
emphasised is the «premium» deriving from «on the job training» 
intended as a proxy for human capital investment. According to 
Becker [1993], one may expect reduced incentives from both 
employers and employees to invest in training activities for fixed 
term job workers. This expectation finds some support from the 
(quite low but nonetheless statistically significant) effect of the on 
the job training activity.  
A similar interpretation might also be made of the positive 
(yearly) effect of the interaction between the years of experience 
in the labor market and holding a temporary contract.  
The persistence of this wage penalty after controlling for 
observables and unobservables micro-individual covariates 
supports our hypothesis # 3. 
5.2. SHIW 2004- 2006 
The Shiw survey is the second dataset that we analyze. Two 
simple cross sectional OLS estimations for years 2004 and 2006, 
same case selection and covariates as the ECHP analysis, yield a 
mean wage penalty for FTC which fluctuates around -9% and -
12%, statistically significant, in line with the fixed effect estimation 
based on ECHP dataset (results not reported). Using the same 
approach as adopted in the previous section on the ECHP data, 
we obtained the following results from two separate multivariate 
regressions based on BE (pooled OLS) and FE estimation (Table 
2). 
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TAB. 2. Log-hourly wage differentials for temporary workers 
 Model 1 BE estimation Model 2 FE estimation 
ln(hourly wage) Coeff. Std.Err. P>t  Coeff. Std.Err. P>t 
Woman -0.115 0.011 0.000     
head of family 0.036 0.011 0.001  0.019 0.024 0.435 
n. earners in HH 0.031 0.005 0.000  0.013 0.011 0.229 
Age 0.006 0.006 0.383  0.087 0.016 0.000 
age squared 0.000 0.000 0.712  -0.001 0.000 0.002 
Tenure 0.005 0.003 0.038  0.000 0.003 0.973 
tenure squared 0.000 0.000 0.228  0.000 0.000 0.651 
years of exp. 0.012 0.004 0.001  -0.010 0.005 0.031 
years of exp. 
squared 
 
0.000 
 
0.000
 
0.000
  
0.000
 
0.000
 
0.068 
FTC -0.117 0.036 0.001  -0.086 0.030 0.004 
low educ -0.213 0.022 0.000  -0.181 0.073 0.014 
middle educ -0.161 0.018 0.000  -0.137 0.063 0.031 
        
(N)  
(3754) 
    (N) 
(3754)
  
R^2=0.50         R^2=0.23 
  
  
Source: SHIW 2004-2006 panel subsample 
Notes: Both models also control for 5 dummy variables of occupational classification, 10 
dummies for type of activity, 7 dummies for firm dimensions.  
 
The Shiw data seems to work much better than do the ECHP 
ones: we observe – for both models – the expected positive and 
significant effects of age, tenure, labor market experience, human 
capital and the negative sign for being female (BE estimation).  
The negative and significant effect of being hired on a FTC 
basis is confirmed also by (both) the models based on Shiw data, 
therefore again confirming our hypothesis # 1. 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity only produces – as 
hypothesized in # 3 – a slight reduction in the strength of the 
wage penalty. This we would interpret as a minor level of hidden 
differences between the groups with temporary and non 
temporary jobs.  
The statistical significance of FTC effect warrants further brief 
discussion. If we had no intra-individual variation over time (i.e. 
no changes in FTC status), FE models would be unable to 
estimate the respective coefficient. In effect, we know from 
previous studies that the transition from FTC to permanent 
employment cannot be regarded as the standard path for the 
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majority of workers? (ECHP-based transition rates are about 40% 
in Italy). Therefore fixed term contracts represent stepping stones 
to guaranteed and stable jobs only for a select group (the reverse 
transition, from a secure to contingent a job, is absolutely less 
frequent). Comparison between FE and OLS wage gap estimates 
should therefore bear in mind that the subsample of workers who 
succeed in transforming fixed term contracts into stable ones 
most likely cannot be considered a random sample of FTC 
workers, but should instead be regarded as positively selected. If 
this is the case, assuming a penalty of only about -9% (FE model) 
is likely to underestimate the «real» mean negative effect of 
holding a fixed term contract7. 
To check whether the wage penalty is confirmed also after a 
radical change of model specification, we ran a non parametrical 
analysis on the same 2006 cross sectional Shiw dataset, shifting to 
a counterfactual approach which enabled us to interpret the wage 
differential in terms of the causal effect of the atypical work arrangement 
(ATE, average treatment effect).  
The use of statistical matching tends to reproduce the 
experimental framework by selecting ex-post from the dataset 
pairs of individuals statistically equivalent to each other: «twins» 
based on a relevant set of covariates, which differ only for the 
«treatment variable» – namely, holding a temporary job (Table 3). 
We ran the match on the subsample of workers with no more 
than five years of experience in the labor market, given that this is 
the group most affected by fixed term contracts. With these 
selection criteria we obtained a sample of 457 standard workers 
and 104 «treated» ones. The matching procedure was performed 
on the following covariates: geographic area (North, Centre, 
South and Islands); gender; number of household members; 
number of earners in the household; being head of household; age 
and age squared; number of different jobs; tenure and its squared 
term; years of labor market experience and its squared term; 
                                                                                    
7 A different issue would be assessing whether the wage penalty is long-lasting: using 
the Shiw 2006 wave, we tested via a simple OLS regression if a previous FTC [in 2004] had 
a negative effect on the 2006 wage. The results (not shown) indicate a persistent, 
significant, wage negative effect of about 5-6%. Owing to small Ns, the interaction term 
FTC2004*FTC2006 (to test for a possible, additional, trap effect) remained non significant 
– even though it was of the expected negative sign. 
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education measured in five categories; occupation measured in 
five categories; 10 dummies for type of activity; 7 dummies for 
firm size; the number of hours worked. 
Tab. 3. Net hourly wage differentials for temporary workers, statistical matching estimation and 
Rosenbaum Sensitivity Test for Hodges-Lehmann Point Estimate  
Average treatment effect  
-1.260 
Std Error 
0.220
t-stat 
-5.520 
Gamma l.bound u.bound 
   
1.000 -1.325 -1.325 
1.100 -1.425 -1.125 
1.200 -1.525 -1.025 
1.300 -1.625 -0.925 
1.400 -1.725 -0.825 
1.500 -1.825 -0.725 
Source: SHIW 2006 cross sectional subsample 
Notes: unit of measurement: Euro; Covariates used: geographic area 3 dummy variables, 
gender, number of family members, number of earners in household, head of family 
dummy, age, age^2, number of different jobs in working life, tenure, tenure^2, years of 
labor market experience, years of labor market experience^2, education 5 dummy variables, 
occupational classification 5 dummy variables, 10 dummies for type of activity, 7 dummies 
for firm size, number of hours worked; Gamma is Log Odds of Differential Assignment 
To Treatment Due To Unobserved Factors.  
 
The estimation procedure that we used is known as «genetic 
matching» [Sekhon forthcoming; Keele 2009]. This is based on an 
iterative algorithm designed to detect the best covariates balance 
between the control and treated groups, the one that minimizes 
and renders non-statistically significant the distances in means and 
distributions of control and treated covariates.  
The results are in line with those of the previous regression 
analyses. 
The net mean wage differential (or ATE, average treatment 
effect) on hourly wage is still statistically significant; in this case 
we may say that a wage penalty of 1.32 euro (because the mean is 
6.92, this equals a wage gap of about -19%) is the wage penalty 
caused by having being hired on a FTC. 
Not needing parametric formulation or distributional 
assumptions is no guarantee against the risk of distortion in the 
estimates. A satisfactory balance of the observable covariates is 
necessary but not sufficient. 
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If there were unobserved variables actually relevant in 
predicting the worker’s contract type, but not included in 
matching process, our ATE would suffer from the same reliability 
problem as the OLS coefficient.  
The Rosenbaum sensitivity test, in this case, provides us with a 
measure of the robustness of our estimation in the case of 
possible unobserved heterogeneity. 
The sensitivity test assumes increasing variation in the Log 
Odds of differential assignment to the treatment (the log odds 
being 1 in the case of no unobserved heterogeneity) and shows a 
confidence interval for each level of misspecification. The 1.32 
euro ATE that we obtained appears robust over a 1.5 gamma 
value. 
5.3. IT-SILC 2004-2006 
The last dataset we use is the Italian component of the Eu-Silc 
panel survey. As before, a (non reported) OLS estimation (It-
Silc2006) of the wage gap showed a penalty of about 9%. As will 
be seen from table 4, this gap is substantially reconfirmed also 
when analyzing the It-Silc panel 2004-2006 using FE models. 
TAB. 4. Log-hourly wage differentials for temporary workers, fixed effects estimation 
ln(hourly wage) Coeff. Std.Err. P>t 
Woman    
Age 0.109 0.008 0.000 
age squared -0.001 0.000 0.000 
years of experience 0.000 0.001 0.920 
years of experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.158 
FTC -0.069 0.015 0.000 
years of exp.* FTC 0.001 0.001 0.090 
(N) (13100)    
R^2=0.18       
Source: It-Silc 2004-2006  
Notes: The model controls for year of the survey, 27 isco88-based occupational categories 
and 5 dummies for education. 
 
Thus, all our analyses, regardless of the dataset or the statistical 
method employed, have confirmed a significant wage penalty, 
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quite stable over time, affecting FTC. This result, therefore, while 
confirming our first hypothesis, allows us to reject the opposite 
compensation hypothesis (table 1, table 2, table 3 and table 4). 
Also testing for «causality» (table 3) yields solid evidence of the 
existence of a negative impact of FTC on wages, thereby again 
confirming our hypothesis # 1. Moreover, our results also exclude 
that the wage gap is due to unobserved heterogeneity, confirming 
hypothesis # 3. As regards human capital accumulation, our 
results (table 1) confirm that once the amount of ‘on the job 
training’ has been controlled for, the wage gap for FTC 
significantly decreases (but does not disappear!). 
The next section will deal with the second hypothesis, which 
asserted the existence of an intra-outsiders differentiation 
affecting the magnitude of the wage differentiation between FTC 
and permanent employment. 
5.4. Inside the gap: a quantile estimation 
Our analyses thus far have provided us with a single estimate 
of the FTC wage penalty: a mean wage gap of about 9-12%, which 
is quite robust and reliable but nonetheless conservative, and 
therefore may have underestimated the FTC penalty and – 
moreover – referring to an «average individual» hired on a FTC. 
We know, however, that the secondary labor market is internally 
quite differentiated, which means that our «average wage gap» may 
be too approximate. Hence also our models have been in some 
way misleading: indeed, we may not (yet) exclude the theoretical 
possibility that some sort of «compensating effect» is at work for a 
very limited and selected segment of our «flexible» workers.  
Using a quantile regression on the same wage equation across 
different datasets, we can decompose the mean effect and 
estimate the impact of a FTC on Ln(hourly net wage) for 
individuals situated at different deciles along the earning 
distribution (Graph 1).  
As expected, the amount of variation around the average is 
quite high: this reminds us of the limitations of the descriptive 
statistics, which in itself is not particularly informative about the 
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shape of the distribution – in this case of the economic risk of 
being a flexible worker in the present-day Italian labor market. 
The FTC wage gap, in fact, ranges from -16% to -2% (quite 
consistently using both Shiw and It-Silc data, and statistically 
significant) with respect to the wage of a permanent employee. 
While definitely rejecting any possibility of a wage-premium (even 
if limited to the «upper» segment of the outsider workers) this 
result reconfirms our expectation (hypothesis 2) concerning the 
internal differentiation of the secondary labor market and 
therefore reminds us that the usual «mean» wage gap methods 
(OLS-FE-ATE) systematically underestimate wage losses for at 
least half of the workers concerned. This may lead to a 
misconception of the economic conditions of atypical 
employment as a secondary social and sociological problem. 
 
GRAPH 1. Quantile regression graphic, It-Silc and Shiw datasets, 2006 
 6. (Not) Concluding remarks 
The foregoing analyses prove far beyond any reasonable doubt 
that temporary jobs are underpaid with respect to equivalent 
permanent positions, given the same characteristics of workers. 
 
 Source: It-Silc and Shiw datasets, 2006 
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Wage differentials since the 1990s are quite stable and significant 
regardless of the statistical method used to estimate them, from 
the simplest OLS on cross sectional data to BE and FE regression 
on panel data, to non parametric statistical matching methods. 
Moreover, and notwithstanding the caution required when 
comparing different datasets with heterogeneous information, the 
wage gap is far from narrowing with the diffusion of temporary 
and flexible forms of employment. Nor does there emerge an 
«upper» segment of the secondary labor market closer to the 
(economic if not normative) conditions of the insider core 
workforce. Our results therefore suggest a segmentation of the 
Italian labor market which is increasing as a consequence of the 
labor policies introduced by various governments in past decades.  
A rising tide of inequality, both normative and economic, is 
gradually overwhelming Italian society. With profound roots in 
the labor market, it has generated a perverse combination of wage 
inequality and job insecurity adjustment. 
Our last hypothesis hints to the crucial point: once we can 
reasonably exclude that the explanation of the wage penalty for 
the secondary labor market is due to individual micro 
characteristics - either observable or unobservable - the need to 
search elsewhere for an explanation becomes self-evident. Our 
results indicate that it must be at the macro, institutional, level that 
such an explanation lies, be it either the strategies of labor cost 
reduction adopted by poorly innovative firms or the bargaining 
power of insiders or the resistance of major interest groups and 
the influence of powerful welfare-state clients (once again insiders 
and unions), or a combination of all these, which have managed to 
direct welfare and labor market reforms towards the non-
organised secondary labor market and the weakest part of society. 
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Equal Job, Unequal Pay 
Fixed Term Contracts and Wage Differentials  in the Italian Labor Market 
Paolo Barbieri and Giorgio Cutuli 
Partial and targeted labor market deregulation as undergone in Italy during the last two decades 
has created a strong cohort cleavage on the labor market as regards the risks of a precarious work 
career. In explaining the logics underlying the different kinds of labor market deregulation, the 
literature stresses the alternative between labor market adjustment based on wage inequality and 
job insecurity. Flexible and unequal labor markets in the English-speaking countries are opposed to 
the continental-European ones, where wage differentiation is limited but deregulation has been
«at the margins».
Notwithstanding the theoretical debate, there is still relatively little empirical evidence regarding
the level of inequality in wages between «contingent» and «secure» work positions, especially in 
Italy, although, given the ongoing debate, one would expect a trade-off between job security and 
wage level to be operating. We use the Italian component of the 1995-2001 ECHP panel waves, 
the SHIW panel 2004-2006, and the new 2004-2006 IT-SILC database, to provide an exhaustive, 
strongly empirical based analysis of the persistence of a clear and significant wage differential 
between contingent and secure work in Italy that parallels and adds to the job insecurity 
dimension. As regard methods, we apply FE panel models, statistical matching and multivariate 
analyses. All our results confirm this specific outcome of the «deregulation at the margins» of the 
Italian labor market.
Paolo Barbieri is associate professor of Economic Sociology, Trento University. He is core
member of the ESF Network «Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences II», board member of 
the ECSR and currently coordinates a project on atypical employment and welfare regimes within 
the network of Excellence EQUALSOC. He recently edited a special issue of «European Sociological 
Review» on Flexible Employment and Inequality in Europe.
Giorgio Cutuli is a PhD candidate in the Doctoral School of Sociology and Social Research, Trento 
University. His dissertation deals with economic inequality between flexible and stable workers in 
Italy. Previous work on the topic has been published in «Polis».
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